http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/186en.htm
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In
1941, Henry Luce proclaimed
the twentieth century the
American century. And most
analysts have agreed with
him ever since. Of course,
the twentieth century was
more than merely the American
century. It was the century
of the decolonization of Asia
and Africa. It was the century
of the flourishing of both
fascism and communism as political
movements. And it was the
century of both the Great
Depression and the incredible,
unprecedented expansion of
the world-economy in the 25
years after the end of the
Second World War. But
nonetheless, it was the American
century. The United States
became the unquestioned hegemonic
power in the period 1945-1970
and shaped a world-system
to its liking. The United
States became the premier
economic producer, the dominant
political force, and the cultural
center of the world-system.
The United States, in short,
ran the show, at least for
a while. Now,
the United States is in visible
decline. More and more analysts
are willing to say this openly,
even if the official line
of the U.S. establishment
is to deny this vigorously,
just as a certain portion
of the world left insists
on the continued hegemony
of the United States. But
clear-minded realists on all
sides recognize that the U.S.
star is growing dimmer. The
question that underlies all
serious prognostication is
then, whose century is the
twenty-first century? Of
course, it is only 2006, and
a bit early to answer this
question with any sense of
certainty. But nonetheless,
political leaders everywhere
are making bets on the answer
and shaping their policies
accordingly. If we rephrase
the question to ask merely
what may the world look like
in, for example, 2025, we
may at least be able to say
something intelligent. There
are basically three sets of
answers to the question of
what the world will look like
in 2025. The first is that
the United States will enjoy
one last fling, a revival
of power, and will continue
to rule the roost in the absence
of any serious military contender.
The second is that China will
displace the United States
as the world's superpower.
The third is that the world
will become an arena of anarchic
and relatively unpredictable
multi-polar disorder. Let
us examine the plausibility
of each of these three predictions. The
United States on top? There
are three reasons to doubt
this. The first, an economic
reason, is the fragility of
the U.S. dollar as the sole
reserve currency in the world-economy.
The dollar is sustained now
by massive infusions of bond
purchases by Japan, China,
Korea, and other countries.
It is highly unlikely that
this will continue. When the
dollar falls dramatically,
it may momentarily increase
the sale of manufactured goods,
but the United States will
lose its command on world
wealth and its ability to
expand the deficit without
serious immediate penalty.
The standard of living will
fall and there will be an
influx of new reserve currencies,
including the euro and the
yen. The
second reason is military.
Both Afghanistan and especially
Iraq have demonstrated in
the last few years that it
is not enough to have airplanes,
ships, and bombs. A nation
must also have a very large
land force to overcome local
resistance. The United States
does not have such a force,
and will not have one, due
to internal political reasons.
Hence, it is doomed to lose
such wars. The
third reason is political.
Nations throughout the world
are drawing the logical conclusion
that they can now defy the
United States politically.
Take the latest instance:
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
which brings together Russia,
China, and four Central Asian
republics, is about to expand
to include India, Pakistan,
Mongolia, and Iran. Iran has
been invited at the very moment
that the United States is
trying to organize a worldwide
campaign against the regime.
The Boston Globe has called
this correctly "an anti-Bush
alliance" and a "tectonic
shift in geopolitics."
Will
China then emerge on top by
2025? To be sure, China is
doing quite well economically,
is expanding its military
force considerably, and is
even beginning to play a serious
political role in regions
far from its borders. China
will undoubtedly be much stronger
in 2025; however, China faces
three problems that it must
overcome. The
first problem is internal.
China is not politically stabilized.
The one-party structure has
the force of economic success
and nationalist sentiment
in its favor. But it faces
the discontent of about half
of the population that has
been left behind, and the
discontent of the other half
about the limits on their
internal political freedom.
China's
second problem concerns the
world-economy. The incredible
expansion of consumption in
China (along with that of
India) will take its toll
both on the world's ecology
and on the possibilities of
capital accumulation. Too
many consumers and too many
producers will have severe
repercussions on worldwide
profit levels. The
third problem lies with China's
neighbors. Were China to accomplish
the reintegration of Taiwan,
help arrange the reunification
of the Koreas, and come to
terms (psychologically and
politically) with Japan, there
might be an East Asian unified
geopolitical structure that
could assume a hegemonic position.
The
last scenario is that of multi-polar
anarchy and wild economic
fluctuations. Given the inability
of maintaining an old hegemonic
power, the difficulty of establishing
a new one, and the crisis
in worldwide capital accumulation,
this third scenario appears
the most likely. --------------------------------------------------------------- Immanuel
Wallerstein --------------------------------------------------------------- |
