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1 Introduction:
One of the great questions
of our age, as it should be of any age, is what policies will go
closest to achieving "human development"? By human development
policies I mean a distribution of resources and opportunities which
maximizes the chances of each individual human being to realize
his or her best potential. This is often discussed in technological
terms, how to create better crops, medicines and so forth so that
the currently existing impediments to human development, such as
poverty and starvation, are removed. But human development cannot
be achieved by science and technology alone. It will also require
political and cultural changes to be realized. In particular a new
political system; a "human political system" will need
to be developed. A human political system means one which organizes
goods and services in a manner consistent with the benefit of all
of humanity rather than simply for the benefit of a particular nation
or state as today's national political systems do. Without such
a "human" political system attempts to promote human development
will continue to founder upon the rock of national differences,
as has happened in the past, with governments putting national priorities
before human priorities.
Traditionally many thinkers and activists have
assumed that a human political system is impossible, unimaginable
even, and have devised their projects on the assumption that human
concerns will always have to be mediated by sovereign nation states
as the major political actors. Such an assumption however is not
supported by the empirical evidence of human history. This paper
provides critiques of two key assumptions that at face value seem
to rule out even considering the building of a human political system.
These two assumptions are that sovereign nation states represent
an inherent and inescapable part of the human condition and that
progress in the expansion of the human political community is not
possible as we cannot change. Once these two assumptions have been
rejected the path is open for us to start building a human political
system, a necessary step to encourage human development.
To begin though I will briefly outline what I
mean by a human political system and why it is essential to achieve
human development.
2 Human Development:
Human development is itself a term capable of
many different interpretations. For the purpose of this paper I
will define it as a framework in which the best potentials of humanity
are either encouraged or are at least capable of being developed.
By the best potentials I mean not just the ability to survive, or
even survive with some degree of comfort, but also to cultivate
other abilities such as creativity, intelligence, cultural identity
and sympathy with others. Two examples illustrate this concept:
Firstly, a society where people did not have enough to eat would
deny people the chance to develop their best potentials, with no
option but to seek food or die they could not cultivate the other
abilities I mentioned above. Secondly, even in a society where there
was enough food shelter and other material goods available to remove
survival problems, it would still be possible for a dictator, or
simply an unjust government, to have policies restricting access
to such goods as education or free speech. This would still make
it impossible for people to develop the full range of human potentials
as noted above. Consequently non-material factors need also be considered
as a necessary part of the concept of human development. It must
be remembered we are talking about "Human" development
so we should not lose sight of the necessity to make it possible
for all to fulfill their human potential. But since so many people
today are denied the chance to realize their best potential by the
simple fact of poverty and hunger I will for the remainder of the
discussion try to focus on the meeting of basic needs as a first
step in human development.
3 A human political system:
By a human political system I mean one which respects
our human identity before national religious, tribal or other identities.
Respecting our human identity first does not mean abandoning our
other identities, it means giving our human identity priority. So,
for instance, welfare payments can only be described as being distributed
on a human basis if humans are equally entitled to them. If members
of one or other religion or nationality are excluded, simply because
of their differing religion or nationality then the resulting political
system cannot be described as a human one: It is giving priority
to a religious or national identity rather than a human identity.
The supporters of many national political systems
like to describe themselves as supporting human political systems
but in fact they are national political systems. The government
of Australia, for instance, offers welfare payments to all based
on their economic circumstances rather than their nationality or
religion. That is, unless the applicant is not an Australian citizen
or Australian permanent resident. Such applicants are denied welfare
payments as they do not fit the national identity criteria requirements
of the system. This makes the Australian political system a national
one rather than a human one. Even though its political rhetoric
constantly refers to human rights and non discrimination most political
goods are reserved for Australians only. This analysis of the Australian
political system could be applied to almost any country on Earth.
At this point in the analysis a reader may object that it is impossible
for national political systems to offer human political justice
and so it is unfair to criticize them for this. That is exactly
the point; they cannot offer human justice or a political system
consistent with human development as they necessarily discriminate
against all humans except the tiny minority represented by their
fellow nationals.
What would a human political system look like?
There are many possible forms. As the focus of this paper is on
why a national system is not inevitable I will only offer the briefest
sketch of what a human political system might look like. It could
come in a range of forms. From an extreme at one range of possibility;
a comprehensive world state which established common standards in
a range of areas to an extreme at the other range of possibility;
a scenario where all countries just happened to cooperate on all
key issues without any diminution of sovereignty at all. The human
political system which we will develop in the future will most likely
be something in between these two extremes. For instance something
built on the model of the European Union, but open to all to join,
could be the model for developing a human political system. This
could be called a Human Union and it would steadily grow as it acquired
new members. What distinguishes a human political system from earlier
forms of internationalism is that it requires some form of common
political rights be respected for all humans. The United Nations,
for instance, puts national sovereignty first, and so there is no
guarantee of any form of basic rights for citizens of its member
states. The cruelest dictatorship can sit alongside the most benign
democracy as a rightful member. An institution designed this way
cannot be the platform for building a human political system. The
European Union, by way of contrast, does require some basic commitment
to democracy and human rights as part of its membership requirements
so making it possible to develop an actual political community where
individuals all share some rights. While other problems facing the
European Union make it seem unlikely that a Human Union could be
launched simply by borrowing the EU model holus bolus and changing
the first name to Human, the basic concept is analogous to what
a Human union might look like.
4 But why is a human political system
needed for Human Development?
This is the simplest question to answer. Without
a commitment to human values we have the uneven distribution of
political goods that faces the world today. A full project of human
development is impossible while the national interest prevails over
the human interest. At the moment economic and social policy in
every country in the world is geared towards benefiting that country
regardless of its impact on other countries. Countries that are
already wealthier than average only strive to be even wealthier
as they react to the relative poverty of fellow nationals inside
their political system rather than the actual poverty of fellow
humans outside it. People within the national political systems
are blinded to this incongruity as the political discourse of their
world conditions them to see poverty as poverty inside their country,
economic growth as economic growth inside their country and so forth.
We have national political systems seeking national development
rather than human development.
Every time we see an outcry in wealthy countries
against cheap imports from poorer countries; the very evidence of
progress in those poorer countries we see how national political
systems militate against human development. Every time we see people
denied freedom of movement from one country to another to seek a
better opportunity in life we see how national political systems
work against human development. Every time we read that a wealthy
country has no extra wealth available to help people in poorer countries
we see how national political systems work against human development.
Every time we read about the obesity crisis in wealthy countries,
occurring at the same time as the starvation crisis in other countries
we see how national political systems work against human development.
But this paper is not about the arguments for
a human political system so much as reminding us of the empirical
evidence that defeats the two assumptions mentioned earlier. The
goal is not to say everything about these two assumptions but to
draw the reader's attention to some of the easily available evidence
which easily overwhelms these assumptions and thus frees the mind
to consider the possibilities of building a human political system.
The initial impetus to prepare this paper comes from the call for
contributions to a scientific journal sponsored collection of articles
related to human development so it is important to emphasize that
what is being pointed to here is the empirical evidence which falsifies
these assumptions. The next two parts remind us of how this empirical
evidence is easily available in the world and knowledge around us
today.
5 The inherent sovereign nation state
assumption:
Political nationalism, the idea that a "nation"
must have its own separate political state with absolute sovereignty
over territory is a very recent development in human history. The
earliest homo sapiens fossils found so far are about 150,000 years
old, settled agriculture started not much more than 10-12,000 years
ago, and most of today's nation states only came into existence
in the last 200 years. We did not spend 150,000 years pining for
freedom for our countries but only in the last few centuries have
decided that this is the way to organize ourselves.
Most states come into existence accompanied by
a widely believed narrative about how the "people" of
the state had a common history from time immemorial. But, to give
just one example of a modern nation state, history shows that most
Germans felt no need to have a united German state until a few hundred
years ago, focusing their energies prior to that on a range of tribal,
political and religious affiliations which were always deemed more
important than the abstract idea that all Germans should live in
the one country. These comments could be made about the national
narrative of almost every country in the world today. It is in fact
so uncontroversial a claim that standard reference texts such as
the encyclopedia Britannica describe nationalism as a modern movement.
Its article on the topic (in part) states that:
"Throughout history people have been attached
to their native soil, to the traditions of their parents, and to
established territorial authorities; but it was not until the end
of the 18th century that nationalism began to be a generally recognized
sentiment molding public and private life and one of the great,
if not the greatest, single determining factors of modern history.
Because of its dynamic vitality and its all-pervading character,
nationalism is often thought to be very old; sometimes it is mistakenly
regarded as a permanent factor in political behaviour. Actually,
the American and French revolutions may be regarded as its first
powerful manifestations.
This lengthy quote is provided to show just how
uncontroversial it is to state that political nationalism is a new
phenomenon.
Various explanations have been put forward for
the rise of political nationalism: The decline of religious belief
in the west from the 16th century saw people slowly transfer their
loyalty to new transcendent ideals; such as the nation, which lived
on after the individual died and which vouchsafed the individuals'
identity, wars came to be fought for the nation as the touchstone
of identity rather than religion. The rise of the printing press
has also been suggested as a cause of nationalism's rise, allowing
cheap texts in vernacular literature to become widely available,
thus building up a common consciousness and a "national"
dialogue in which intellectuals (writing in the vernacular rather
than Latin) and others found they were participating more and more.
The rise of industrialism has also been pointed to as its need for
a trained, organized and loyal workforce provided an incentive to
develop nationalist ideologies to keep workers happy and working
in a prescribed area. There is also, of course, the demonstration
effect: By the 19th century large political systems such as those
of India and China found themselves powerless before the onslaught
of the highly organized and motivated "national" armies
of Western European colonialists. Intellectuals in many areas drew
the conclusion that the only solution was to develop a local narrative
of identity and then campaign for that identity to be recognized
as a nation with its own right to be an independent state.
This article is not concerned to offer one or
several precise theories that officially explain the rise of nationalism.
The point only is to show that it is a new phenomenon and one based
on changing ideas rather than something that is somehow built into
us. So rather than looking at the above arguments in more detail
I will provide a brief narrative account of the last few hundred
years of international political history. This is offered to illustrate
the recent and contrived nature of national identity. While most
readers would already be aware of this history many people do not
take it into account when the argument switches to contemporary
politics and people assert the inherent nature of national identity.
This summary overview is mostly based upon the historical overview
I provided in the book "Humanity or Sovereignty" and also
uses information from well known general histories.
I will start with the Roman Empire. This at its
peak, it was a multicultural, multiracial, multireligious entity.
Over the course of its development the rights of Roman citizenship
were eventually extended from the people of Rome to people from
anywhere within the empire, other than women and slaves. The dominating
ideal was Romanitis, to be a good Roman. Roman emperors came from
many different regions in the empire, not just Rome. To pick just
one example, Diocletian, one of the most famous emperors, came from
what is now Croatia, but he is historically known as a Roman emperor,
not a Croatian politician.
The fall of the Roman Empire, when it came, was
not hailed as a chance for subject nations to be free but viewed
with horror as a collapse of civilization! Contemporary writers,
such as Augustine, sought to explain the catastrophe in various
ways, but nobody celebrated it as a chance for the nations of Europe
to have their independence.
Indeed for most of the following "medieval"
period people sought a return of Roman unity rather than national
separateness. The ideal of Christendom replaced the Roman ideal
as a universal ideal. The Papacy rose to political significance
as an embodiment of this universalism. A parallel civil institution
called the Holy Roman Empire also came into existence. Both these
institutions sought a universal political system rather than a break
up into nation states. Both presided over systems that often declined
into violence and conflict, but almost never faced movements for
one nation to be "free" and "independent" as
such a concept did not effectively exist at that time.
The Protestant Reformation (initiated in 1517)
ended the viability of the medieval system and ushered in a century
of ferocious violence, climaxing with the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).
As people began to tire of religious warfare, a new form of political
loyalty began to emerge. People began to argue that people from
the same area should not kill each other over religious differences,
as what they had in common was more important than what divided
them. A first attempt to formalize this came with the treaty of
Westphalia, in 1648, which redrew the map of Europe and assigned
sovereign rights to each area. The ruler of each area was to be
sovereign, and the rights of the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor to
intervene were restricted.
This swing toward the concept of sovereignty coincided
with a waning of religious faith and a rise of political nationalism.
In the following centuries an increasing number of thinkers started
to argue that something different-national identity-was the most
important aspect of political life. Thinkers as diverse as Milton,
Herder, Savigny, and Mazzini steadily convinced people that they
shared a national identity and should be united in nation-states.
Where a fourteenth-century Italian cultural figure such as the poet
Dante could only speculate about a united Christendom in Europe,
a nineteenth-century Italian cultural identity such as the composer
Verdi was a passionate advocate of Italian unity.
Gradually, national loyalty grew to replace religious
loyalty as the prime focus of political activity. As Benedict Anderson
shows, a new identity was imagined for people, a national identity,
and then activists set out to turn the national imagining into a
political reality. Warfare provides the most brutal illustration
of this. In the 1500s, people across Europe killed each other based
on whether they were Catholic or Protestant. But as they imagined
and created common national identities it became unseemly to kill
fellow French or fellow Germans just because of a religious difference.
In this way religious tolerance, within the nation, was one of the
achievements of the swing to nationalism. But, as a replacement,
people started to kill each other over national differences, so
Frenchmen killing Germans and vice versa replaced Catholics and
Protestants killing each other over the same geographic region.
Throughout the nineteenth century, nation after nation rose, each
declaring that it had existed forever; places such as Germany and
Italy suddenly united into passionately nationalistic, unified political
entities; and groups such as the Greeks fought for their "national"
independence.
By the twentieth century, nationalism had become
the prime focus of political loyalty. The two world wars of that
century, fought by national rather than religious armies, surpassed
even the ferocity of the wars of religion. Catholic slaughtered
Catholic and Protestant slaughtered Protestant across the trenches
during World War I, as nationalism proved it had gained a stronger
grip on people's minds than religion once held. Treason replaced
heresy as the crime most threatening to the established order. The
national security agency replaced the inquisition as the extra legal
agency engaged in ferreting out deviant thinkers and harassing them
into conformity. Nothing was more important than the national interest.
From the 19th century onwards nationalism started
being exported from Europe and became a world phenomenon rather
than just a European phenomenon. The European powers were able to
expand outside Europe in the phenomenon known as imperialism. By
the twentieth century, European empires covered most of the world
and had cowed most of the unconquered areas. But imperialism carried
within it the seeds of its own destruction. This was the ideology
of nationalism that the European empires carried with them. Subject
peoples everywhere absorbed this idea and rather than demanding
political equality within multiethnic and multiracial cosmopolitan
empires (which nationalism likewise compelled most of their conquerors
to deny them) as had occurred in the Roman Empire they demanded
the same sacred identity as their conquerors, the right to a sovereign
nation state. Soon subject peoples everywhere were organizing themselves
into nations and demanding their freedom, which usually meant they
formed a separate independent sovereign national state.
All over Asia, Africa, and South America, writers
imagined and described national identities and newly invented nations
fought for their independence. Figures as diverse as Sun Yat Sen,
Kemal Attaturk, Jomo Kenyatta and Jan Smutts set out to convince
people that they shared a national identity which required a freedom
that could be achieved in a sovereign nation state designed along
modern lines. By the end of the twentieth century, imperialism was
largely gone and we have today's world of sovereign states. Instead
of moving from imperialism to a human political system, we have
moved from imperialism to sovereignty and a national political system.
The one political movement that had seriously
attempted to stem the rise of political nationalism in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was Marxism. Karl Marx had insisted
that economic relations were more important than ideas or culture.
The solidarity created by the workers economic status should cross
national borders and the workingmen of the world would unite. Marxist
socialist movements therefore organized themselves as "Internationals
" and expected to lead the worldwide working class in revolution.
In the lead up to World War I, the leaders of the "Second International"
(the first had collapsed due to internal squabbles) expected the
workers of France and Germany to work together rather than go to
war against each other. The workers however, seduced by the ideology
of nationalism, slaughtered each other in the hundreds of thousands
and the "Second International" collapsed. Later on the
Marxist movement repeatedly succumbed to nationalism as Stalin pioneered
the concept of "socialism in one country" and communist
states such as Russia and China put their national identities ahead
of "fraternal cooperation."
Thus even a brief glance at recent history shows
that rather than being an inherent part of the human condition political
nationalism is a recent phenomenon. It is a new ideology not an
inescapable fact of life.
It is not correct to oppose the building of a
human political system on the grounds that it is unnatural or goes
against human nature as is shown by our division into sovereign
states. The division into sovereign states is itself an ideological
decision which has only been made recently, it is not in any way
a law of nature. Those who would try to treat this as an issue of
science cannot claim any scientific basis for treating the system
of sovereign nation states as permanent and inherent, it is contingent
and created.
Even when we acknowledge the contingent nature
of national identity there still remains the question of whether
change is possible. What reason is there for saying we can move
to a human political system? The next section addresses the second
problematic assumption; that we cannot change.
6 The assumption that political progress
is impossible because we cannot change:
This assumption can also be easily falsified just
by pointing to the basic facts of history which are available to
everyone. Human political systems have never been stagnant. Change
has occurred quite regularly throughout recorded history. It has
not always been change for the better but there has always been
change.
For many people the kaleidoscopes of changing
theories, philosophies and political systems over the centuries
has no clear pattern. The transitions from tribal chieftains to
Kings to priestly rulers to democrats or tyrants, pagan or Christian,
Emperor or President have occurred constantly without ever bringing
us to a perfect state of being. This seems to be true but one class
of change can be described as linear, even if its forward movements
are sometimes separated by centuries and there are also the occasional
backward steps. This class of change is the change that occurs when
we widen the circle of those to whom we extend equal political treatment.
Such changes as the abolition of slavery, the
attack on religious discrimination, and the acknowledgement of the
equal status of women have all had the character of a widening of
the circle of those to whom we extend basic respect and courtesy.
While these changes have not always occurred in a neat and systematic
progression they have occurred.
In a well known recent book the philosopher Peter
Singer describes history as being characterized by an ever-expanding
"moral circle" . This moral circle was first created a
long time ago when early human beings only appreciated loyalties
and duties to their immediate kin. The family, on this model, was
the first moral circle and moral duties were not owed to people
outside the circle. But over the course of history the moral circle
has steadily expanded outwards from the family to the tribe and
to ever-widening groups until, according to Singer, it reaches all
of humanity and animals.
Singer's model of a steady expansion overstates
the ease with which the moral circle has expanded over the centuries.
There have been regressive periods when the circle shrank as well
as expansive periods. In strict terms there has not been a moral
circle so much as a general acceptance of basic decency and entitlement
to basic political rights, and the class of people this is applied
to has expanded over time. But the basic idea is a good metaphor
for what is being described here. Whenever people have realized
that "them" are just the same as "us", they
realize the "them" must be treated equally and regarded`
as us. In many great reform movements such as campaigns against
slavery and racism the "us" turns out to be humanity.
We realize that people of other races are "human" too
and must receive the same rights as our fellow humans. In this respect
the concept of an expanding moral circle can be understood as an
expanding political circle of basic human respect or basic human
dignity.
A key lesson from the past is that anyone who
in the past declared that the moral circle could not be expanded
any further was, from today's perspective, wrong. From Aristotle's
declaration that some are by nature born to be slaves and others
to be free onwards people who have declared the moral circle of
their time has expanded as far as it can ever expand have always
been wrong.
We know that, barring accidents or self destruction,
humanity has far more years ahead of it than it has already existed.
We have only existed for about 150,000 years but we have potentially
a few billion years ahead of us until the Sun becomes the wrong
temperature to support human life . So why declare that the point
the moral circle has reached at this point in history is the farthest
limit it could ever reach when we know that every person who has
ever declared this in the past has been wrong? And we know we are
still at the beginning of humanity's journey. As a matter of logic
it would seem the burden of proof should be on those who declare
that humans will stop changing and that we have lost our capacity
to go on expanding the moral circle rather than on those who argue
it is possible that we will go on doing what we have always done
(albeit intermittently and often after great argument), expand the
moral circle.
This point is emphasized when we remember that
a human political system would only be a political system. It would
not require all humans to love each other, simply to accept they
lived in a common political community. The US political system,
for instance, functions because most citizens accept they all live
in one common political community, the USA, it certainly does not
require all Americans to love each other! So the threshold for the
expansion of the moral circle I am talking about here is quite low.
The other key piece of empirical evidence here
is that our political rhetoric has started to recognize the expansion
of our current moral circle to include our fellow humans. We now
talk about human rights and crimes against humanity. Many nations
today have claimed to support the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. While such declarations have not been matched by
practice they are straws in the wind that we are already taking
the steps to move from national political communities to a human
political community.
To call for a human political system is not to
ask for something incredible or impossible. It is only to ask that
we realize that our political moral circle be expanded to include
respect for all who are effected by it, our fellow humans. We have
seen that there is no need for the existing political moral circle
to stop at national borders; we have seen that political nationalism
is not an inherent and unchangeable part of human identity. Just
as from the perspective even of nationalism we can see how absurd
tribalism is, so from the perspective of our humanity we can see
how absurd political nationalism is, and appreciate the need to
expand our political moral circle.
While it is almost impossible to deny that, in
general, the moral circle has expanded, explaining why it has expanded
is a difficult question. There are many culture specific explanations,
such as it is all thanks to a particular religion or social system
that the moral circle has expanded . More generalized, less culturally
specific, explanations tend to fall into two groups. There are those
who argue that the flowering of reason will inevitably lead to a
broader human political community and there are those who argue
that we possess an innate moral sense or sense of empathy and that
the eventual flowering of this will eventually lead to a broader
human political community. The view based on the flowering of reason
has been a strain of western thought since the Enlightenment, the
moral sense position also has a strong heritage and has made something
of a comeback in recent times . Well known contemporary scientific
authors such as Steven Pinker write as though it is clearly established
that we have a moral sense.
The moral sense viewpoint is probably best understood
as an ability to feel empathy with others rather than a strict "sense"
for morals. Our empathy when we see another suffering causes us
to feel concern and develop a "moral" feeling to help
them. Thus, when we expand the moral circle we are saying we now
feel empathy with a broader class of people and can no longer discriminate
against them. For instance, when black people were seen as less
than human it was difficult to feel empathy for their suffering
as slaves. But as people became aware of their shared humanity the
moral circle expanded and our sense of sympathy for our fellows,
our moral sense, was aroused, and slavery had to end. Of course
the two positions, reason and moral sense, can overlap and even
be mutually dependant. It is easy to argue that we will use reason
to realize that we have something in common with a broader class
of beings and our sense of empathy will then be aroused, or vice
versa; we feel empathy with the suffering of another creature and
our reason tells us that this means we must have something in common
with it.
But there is no need to discuss here whether either
of these or some other approach has better explanatory power. The
point is that the "moral circle" has expanded in the past
on the basis of recognizing our common humanity with others and
there is no reason why it cannot do so again so that we realize
we need to move from national political systems to human political
systems. The assumption that we cannot change, that the moral circle
will never expand again, cannot be justified on the basis of our
record so far. Change and progress is not impossible, merely uncertain
and unpredictable.
7 Conclusion:
This paper has provided the outline of an argument
that a human political system is necessary of we are ever going
to promote human development effectively. It has then, in more detail,
looked at two key assumptions against the possibility of building
a human political system. The first assumption; that we are inherently
divided into competing nation states has been clearly shown to be
unsupported by the evidence. The empirical evidence showing instead
that political nationalism is a recent ideological development.
The second assumption; that change from national political systems
to a human political system is impossible as humans do not change,
was also shown to be contradicted by the empirical evidence of history
which showed an inconsistently expanding moral circle over time.
This does not mean we will develop a human political system. But
the empirical evidence is consistent with the fact that such a system
is possible, and desirable if we want to expand our moral circle
and achieve true human development.
Thus the principal argument remains that we need
to develop a human political system if we hope to foster human development.
Two of the key presumptions against the possibility of a human political
system have been shown to be lacking in empirical support. It is
now time for us to start turning towards the task of working out
what a human political system would look like and starting to build
one.
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